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In 1998, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (U.S. EPA) convened a special panel
of its science advisory board to address the
contentious issue of administering pesticides
to volunteer subjects. The issue came to pub-
lic attention because of provisions in the
Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 (1) that
called for an added 10-fold safety factor for
children beyond safety factors already applied
to animal data. Pesticide manufacturers, con-
fronted by these more rigorous standards,
sought to eliminate the 10-fold species
extrapolation factor by providing experimen-
tal data from human subjects. The panel was
charged with two main tasks: determining
what characteristics of a human study were
appropriate for regulatory decisions and
defining the ethical implications of such a
study. Because of the role that pesticides play
in the food supply and in the control of dis-
ease, the panel also was asked to discuss
potential risks and benefits of volunteer
studies to both individuals and society.
The panel’s report (2) emphasized that
the threshold for justiﬁcation of such studies
should be set at a very high level and that
deliberate exposure be approached with the
greatest degree of caution. It also noted that
agency policy must adequately consider vul-
nerable populations such as fetuses, children,
pregnant women, the elderly, and those with
already compromised health. The report’s
comments on risks and benefits urged con-
sideration not of risk–benefit ratios in isola-
tion, but of the distribution of risks and
beneﬁts across populations. Put another way,
it insisted that risks should not be imposed
on one population to secure benefits for
another population. 
A crucial issue obscured by the panel’s
charge to review the ethical framework gov-
erning treatment of volunteers was that of
involuntary exposure. Exposure to environ-
mental chemicals such as pesticides is largely
beyond the control of those exposed and is
governed by an entirely different set of prac-
tices and standards. This article argues that the
panel’s conclusions should also be seen from a
much wider perspective: What ethical princi-
ples should control the deposition and disper-
sal in the environment of chemicals with
potentially adverse effects on health, especially
those identiﬁed as or suspected to be develop-
mental toxicants? Should ethical questions be
formally included in the process of risk assess-
ment and risk management, especially within
the boundaries of risk characterization? If so,
how might the process be implemented? 
Guides to Human
Experimentation
The planning of clinical investigations
accords a major role to informed consent.
Institutional review boards review the design
of the investigation and the risks it may pose
to participants, but they just as carefully scru-
tinize how clearly and completely the subjects
have been informed of the possible risks.
Clinical investigations of drugs, particularly
new ones, are only one phase in a long chain
of investigations based on previous extensive
animal research. 
Except for pesticides, which are covered by
the provisions of the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (3) and which
undergo a deﬁned series of toxicity tests before
marketing, toxic chemicals can be introduced
into the environment with relatively modest
or even minimal toxicity testing. In essence,
for many agents the most extensive testing is
conducted in humans exposed after the agent
has been introduced. Even those tested
according to contemporary guidelines, how-
ever, introduce a troublesome ethical gap. 
The ethical dilemmas stem from three
pillars of protection of human subjects in
research. The National Commission for the
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical
and Behavioral Research, established in 1974,
issued a document in 1979 known as the
Belmont Report, which afﬁrms the basic ethical
principles, equivalent to those issued later, that
guide the conduct of research with human sub-
jects (4). One is beneficence, which requires
that researchers maximize the potential beneﬁts
to the subjects and minimize the risks of harm.
A second principle is justice, which embodies
the question of who receives the benefits of
research and who bears its burdens. A third is
respect for persons, the source of the guidelines
for informed consent. It requires that subjects
enter into the research voluntarily and with
adequate information. Here, children receive
special consideration because they are held to
lack adequate capacity for self-determination. 
An ethical challenge is posed by the conﬂict
between the Belmont principles and how soci-
ety governs the discharge and dispersal of toxic
substances into the environment, especially
those that may endanger early development. 
Justice
Most often, chemicals are discharged into the
environment to beneﬁt the discharger. Those
who undergo the exposure do not participate
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in the proﬁts, which are readily monetizable.
The benefits to those exposed cannot be
monetized except in vague terms; for exam-
ple, the possibility of lower prices for com-
modities. The risks and benefits are almost
totally mismatched.
Beneﬁcence 
This principle, whose axioms are a) do no
harm and b) maximize beneﬁts and minimize
harms, holds that those who are responsible
for imposing risks incur obligations to justify
those risks and to distribute the benefits to
those most in need of them. Again, we have
no adequate framework for assessing beneﬁts
for those exposed except on an ambiguous
economic scale.
Respect for Persons
Voluntariness is the key concept. It cannot be
argued that most of us expose ourselves to
environmental toxicants voluntarily. The expo-
sures are inadvertent and often inescapable. An
even more critical point is that we are not
given the opportunity for informed consent.
The fetus, infant, and child possess essentially
no choice at all. 
Developmental exposures heighten the
disjunction between the ethical principles gov-
erning volunteer studies and the lack of corre-
sponding principles governing environmental
exposures. Of the over 80,000 chemicals used
in commerce and industry, dismayingly few
have been subjected to even superﬁcial toxicity
testing, and of the 3,000 produced or
imported at over 1 million pounds per year,
only about a quarter have undergone any test-
ing for developmental toxicity (5). Even for
those few, the depth of detail is inadequate to
determine if they pose a health hazard, partic-
ularly to the developing brain. We are faced
with a striking disparity between the commu-
nity’s concerns about developmental disabili-
ties and our knowledge of their etiologies, a
disparity so wide that it prompts questions
about the ethical implications of allowing
exposure to chemical agents with the potential
to impair brain development. 
Developmental Neurotoxicity
The dearth of information linking develop-
mental disorders and their possible environ-
mental etiologies is recognized by federal
agencies. For example, the U.S. EPA, in col-
laboration with the International Life Sciences
Institute (ILSI), recently launched an effort to
develop a set of developmental neurotoxicity
guidelines encompassing behavior, morphol-
ogy, and pharmacokinetics (6). The National
Institute of Environmental Health Sciences has
issued a request for proposals for Children’s
Environmental Health Centers that will focus
on environmental chemical contributions to
developmental disabilities. Even the media
have begun to pay attention to this problem.
U.S. News and World Report featured a story in
their issue of June 19, 2000, titled “Kids at
risk. Chemicals in the environment come
under scrutiny as the number of childhood
learning problems soars” (7). It asked whether
environmental chemicals might be responsible
for current rates of learning disabilities, atten-
tion deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder, and other
developmental problems.
Although the effort by ILSI and the U.S.
EPA will contribute toward resolving the
question of how to identify developmental
neurotoxicants, such efforts are destined to
fall far short of inclusiveness. Even with pesti-
cides, which are the environmental chemicals
subject to the closest regulation, our knowl-
edge of their potential to interfere with
neurobehavioral development remains sur-
prisingly elementary (8). The situation with
other classes of chemicals is even less promis-
ing. Our ignorance of this potential creates a
series of ethical quandaries, because in the
absence of definitive information, we are in
essence asking the most powerless members
of society to participate in a massive experi-
ment in which risks and benefits are not
shared equitably and in which informed
consent vanishes as an ethical principle.
Several special features of developmental
exposure to neurotoxicants underscore the
information dilemma. First, we now recognize
that events occurring early in the course of
brain development attain functional expres-
sion in different forms throughout a lifetime.
These early events might even be predisposing
factors for neurodegenerative diseases during
advanced age, a problem phrased as “silent tox-
icity” (9). How is it possible to gauge such an
outcome without complex longitudinal studies
that are not seen as part of current guidelines?
Furthermore, assays of functional expression
also require more than minimal techniques
and instruments; they may require, instead,
painstaking, advanced, novel, and expensive
techniques (10). Some leave legacies such as
reduced earning capacity or may show their
inﬂuence most clearly in subject populations
already challenged by other kinds of stress such
as poverty (11). Chemical risk assessment typi-
cally takes a position independent of other
adverse, often interacting, inﬂuences.
Unforeseen Consequences:
Endocrine Disruption
The discovery, described compellingly by
Colborn et al. (12), that so many common
commercial chemicals and chemical contami-
nants act as endocrine disruptors exempliﬁes
the ethical predicament. Toxicologists paid
little attention to endocrine function before
Colborn and her collaborators assembled a
huge volume of data to underscore its impor-
tance. But developmental neurotoxicity is
now faced with a new set of questions arising
from endocrine disruptors. Many different
kinds of chemicals are recognized for their
ability to interfere with endocrine function,
particularly during early development (13).
The array of endocrine-disrupting chemicals
includes many different classes.
The endocrine disruptor issue demon-
strated how little we knew about the chemi-
cals emitted into our environment despite all
the regulations and research that were sup-
posed to protect public health. It would be
ingenuous not to expect more surprises in the
future. They can arise both from chemicals
already in use and present in the environment
and from new ones as well. The emergence of
endocrine disruption as a health risk is a pow-
erful example of how, because of incomplete
and fragmentary information, the public was
subjected to a massive clinical trial. It is an
example of how we have bypassed the equiva-
lents of the ethical tenets that govern the
design and conduct of such trials.
Ethics Assessment for
Environmental Exposures
Can the principles of the Belmont Report,
which was devised primarily as guidance for
clinical trials, be applied and justified in the
wider context of environmental exposures?
President Clinton’s statement, made against
the background of the Tuskegee Syphilis
Study in a 1997 commencement address at
Morgan State University, implies more than
it says on the surface: “We must never allow
our citizens to be unwitting guinea pigs in
scientific experiments that put them at risk
without their consent and full knowledge.”
Commercial products released either
deliberately or adventitiously into the envi-
ronment are not the object of scientific
research designed speciﬁcally to treat disease.
To what standards of risk should they then be
held? Should they meet the same standards as
pharmaceuticals? Wier (14) put the question
in this way:
Guidelines for developmental toxicity
testing of pharmaceuticals have required
behavioral evaluations since 1975 . . . .
Therefore, the safety assessment of new
pharmaceuticals marketed internationally
is made with consideration for all major
end points of developmental toxicity, in
contrast to the situation for chemicals
other than drugs for which “triggers”
speciﬁcally for behavioral evaluations have
been proposed. . . . These “triggers”
include demonstrated potential to produce
central nervous system malformations;
known neuropharmacologic, neurotoxic,
or hormonal effects in adult animals; and
structural analogy to compounds known to
affect offspring behavior. In the case of the
U.S. Toxic Substances Control Act, behav-
ioral evaluations may be indicated basedEthics assessment
only on exposure potential . . . . The
exposure-based “trigger” is consistent with
the rationale for behavioral evaluations in
the developmental toxicity testing of phar-
maceuticals. Nevertheless, an important
difference is that requirements for basic
teratology and behavioral testing are not
coincident for chemicals other than drugs.
Persuasive support for this statement
comes from data showing that even drugs not
designed to act primarily on central nervous
system function may still induce developmen-
tal neurotoxicity in the form of aberrant
behavior (15). They include classes such as
vitamin analogs, hyperlipemic drugs, antibi-
otics, anticoagulants, antiallergens, and others.
Food dyes fall into this category as well (11).
We have to assume, because we lack com-
plete conﬁdence in our ability to foresee the
potential developmental neurotoxicity of
environmental chemicals, that they pose a
ﬁnite, undeﬁned risk of harm. If we take the
Belmont principles as our ethical guide to
permitting such exposures, we confront
another dilemma: how could a modern soci-
ety function if decisions about the use of
chemicals, which, even with limited use, will
find their way into the communal environ-
ment, comply with requirements analogous
to those governing clinical trials? As a sub-
stitute, we appoint surrogates such as the
U.S. EPA and the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration to enforce compliance with
the conventional standards of risk assessment.
Procedures for conducting an ethics assess-
ment have not been defined for such situa-
tions. Is it possible to construct such a
procedure by drawing upon techniques devel-
oped for other types of amorphous questions?
A Model for Ethics Assessment
Panels of experts or, for community risk ini-
tiatives, residents or other relevant parties, are
often called upon to develop risk rankings or
ratings for environmental hazards. Typically,
such exercises strive for consensus. Consensus
rankings or ratings, however, ignore an
important component of such exercises: dis-
agreements among raters (16). The extent of
variability among raters might reflect the
degree of uncertainty in the data available to
them, or it might even reﬂect a rich data set
that can support diverse interpretations (17).
Much as we have enlisted such panels for risk
ratings, we could also enlist experts or com-
munity members to assign ethical ratings to
environmental exposures. A promising
method for doing so rests on the principles of
fuzzy logic. The term was chosen by its origi-
nator, Lotﬁ Zadeh, to contrast the principles
of his multivalent logic with conventional
binary or Boolean logic. 
Fuzzy logic originated in an engineering
context (18). For example, it can be applied
to design a controller for maintaining the air
temperature in a building at a constant level.
Because it converts terms such as “low” and
“high” to the operations of the controller, it
turns out to be particularly useful for extract-
ing operational precision from verbal impreci-
sion. It calibrates vagueness by deriving
decision rules (19). Its basic premise is that
many things are described as degrees of some-
thing. For example, saying that a person is tall
conveys only a relative, subjective measure of
height. To an average woman, a man 180 cm
in height would likely be described as tall. To
a basketball coach, that term might be
reserved for someone 210 cm in height. A
fuzzy logic deﬁnition of tall would ﬁrst create
what is called a membership class whose lim-
its are anchored at 0 and 1, as in Figure 1.
Such a translation is termed “fuzziﬁcation.” 
For conversion into a fuzzy medium, eth-
ical ratings could adopt the scheme illus-
trated in Figure 2. Judges would be asked,
for example, to provide ratings of justice for
a particular environmental condition.
Rater 1 centers the rating at medium, and
sets boundaries at very low and high. Rater 3
is centered at very low, with boundaries at
extremely low (essentially zero) and low.
Rater 2’s judgments take the form of a trape-
zoid, with the highest degrees of membership
assigned to high and very high, with bound-
aries at medium and extremely high (equiva-
lent here to the maximum, set at 6. The
abscissa’s numerical scale is arbitrary). The
ratings of a panel of judges can then be com-
bined by one or more of several techniques
described in the fuzzy logic literature [e.g.,
Klir and Folger (19)]. 
Assume that a panel has been requested to
provide ethical ratings for a particular envi-
ronmental condition, for example, aerial
spraying of a special pesticide combination to
control an invasive insect species in a com-
munity, or siting a power-generating plant in
a certain area, or permitting the inclusion of a
new gasoline fuel additive during specified
seasons of the year. The panel, provided with
toxicity, health, exposure, and economic data,
is then requested to offer an ethical judgment
about the appropriateness of the action by
rating it on the basis of the three Belmont
Report dimensions: justice (J), beneficence
(B), and respect for persons (R). A variety of
methods can be applied to calculate a group
or consensus profile, which might have an
irregular shape because of differences among
judges. A “crisp,” or single value for any of
the three Belmont criteria may be calculated
(defuzzification) to represent the profile.
Once these have been computed, we next
turn to the rule base typically generated by
fuzzy logic models. Each rule consists of a
fuzzy set denoting a range of values. One rule
base is shown below. It is intended only as an
illustration because it assumes that ratings are
transformed or restricted to only the desig-
nated categories and do not include values
that overlap two membership classes such as
VL and L.
Rule 1: If J is VH and B is VH and R is VH 
Acceptability is 1
Rule 2: If J is VH and B is VH and R is H 
Acceptability is 2
…..
Rule 124: If J is VL and B is VL and R is L
Acceptability is 134
Rule 125: If J is VL and B is VL and R is VL
Acceptability is 135
Compiling such a list of rules makes
ethical judgments about a course of action
much more transparent and provides a stan-
dard for policy decisions by the community
or its representatives. 
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Figure 1. Schematic depiction of the fuzzy deﬁnition of
tallness. A membership value of 1.0 denotes complete
membership in the class, i.e., fuzzy set. Tall varies with
measured height. Membership, as shown here, would
be zero for heights 150 cm and below and 1.0 for
heights 210 cm and above. A height of 180 cm would
correspond to a membership value of 0.5.
Figure 2. Showing how different raters might rate the
ethical implications of a specified activity or exposure
to a specified agent or class of agents. Rater 1 judges
the designated criterion (justice, beneficence, or
respect for persons) to be centered at medium, with
asymmetrical boundaries at very low and high. Rater 2
assigns maximum membership to both very high and
high. Rater 3 centers maximum membership at very low
with symmetrical boundaries at extremely low (effec-
tively zero) and low. The abscissa is anchored at zero
and 6 and is arbitrary because it is simply incorporated
into the decision rules.Weiss
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Precautionary Principle
Although their congruence is far from
complete, elements of ethics assessment and
the precautionary principle reflect similar
uneasiness about the scope of environmental
hazards and evoke comparable quandaries in
policy. The precautionary principle approaches
environmental and public health policy deci-
sions from a vantage point in conﬂict with the
traditional position. At present, we base deci-
sions about environmental policy on accept-
able risk, which, in reality, translates to “How
high can we afford to elevate exposure levels
without inducing detectable adverse effects?”
From this perspective, the burden of demon-
strating adverse health effects at environmental
exposure levels falls on the public itself. In
essence, customary practice assumes that toxic
agents and hazardous practices are entitled to
more rights than the public and are innocent
until proven guilty. 
The precautionary principle, in effect,
reverses this process. It thrusts the responsi-
bility for proof on those who create the risks.
Its guiding rule declares that we are obliged to
initiate precautionary or preventive measures
when a specified activity threatens to harm
health or the environment, even if a direct
cause-and-effect linkage has not been demon-
strated unequivocally. Fulfilling the princi-
ple’s rules also requires participation by the
affected public, which expands decision pow-
ers to the community and even wider publics. 
Ethics assessment and the precautionary
principle intersect at this juncture. Where the
precautionary principle shifts the burden of
proof, ethics assessment poses questions of
balance as well: Who creates and proﬁts from
the risks and who assumes them? To what
degree do those creating risks share the
benefits with those subjected to them? How
effectively are the risks communicated to
those at risk and to what extent do they
undertake them voluntarily? 
Ethics assessment would especially high-
light how often the public is asked to accept
inadequate information about many if not
most of the toxic or potentially toxic chemi-
cals pervading our environment. Such igno-
rance becomes particularly dismaying with
every new bit of evidence that science uncov-
ers about the vulnerability of the developing
brain because here is where the ethical dimen-
sions of justice, beneﬁcence, and voluntariness
clash with traditional practices. Endocrine dis-
ruptors are only the most recent and visible
example (20) of how often risk has been over-
looked or miscalculated or resisted. Endocrine
disruption also underscores the problem that
conventional risk assessment is based on inves-
tigations of single chemicals rather than their
cumulative weight, and that our calculations
of chemical risks generally ignore the social
and economic circumstances, such as poverty,
in which they are embedded (11). The process
of risk characterization, conceived in the past
simply as a conjunction of response probabil-
ity and exposure level, is currently seen as a
much broader effort that also involves com-
munity standards and perspectives (21).
Perhaps it is time now to add one more
element: ethics assessment. 
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